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Abstract
We propose and develop a model of behavior in threshold public good games. The
model draws on learning direction theory and impulse balance theory. We ￿nd good
support for the model and demonstrate that it can explain the success rates observed
in threshold public good experiments. The model is applied in a variety of di⁄erent
settings: we compare games with a full refund to those with no refund, consider changes
in relative endowment, and consider changes in the step return and net reward.
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The basic motivation behind this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to better
understand contributions towards threshold public goods. Such goods are of wide practical
importance, and the subject of a large empirical literature (e.g. Croson and Marks 2000;
Cadsby et al. 2008; Coats et al. 2009). To the best of our knowledge, however, prior
research provides no satisfactory theoretical model that can explain the empirical results.
We shall propose a model that we believe can bridge this fundamental gap. The model
draws on the ideas of learning direction theory and impulse balance theory (e.g. Selten et
al. 2005; Ockenfels and Selten 2005).
A threshold public good is a public good that is provided if and only if contributions
reach some critical threshold. The classic example is a new facility, such as a school, arts
centre, or library, that would cost the community $x to build (Andreoni 1998). A more
mundane example is a new TV that would cost ￿ atmates $x to purchase. In short, many
goods can be classi￿ed as threshold public goods (Bagnoli and McKee 1991). An important
question, therefore, is whether such goods will be provided at the Pareto e¢ cient level.
The empricial evidence suggests that groups are typically ine¢ cient at providing threshold
public goods. In particular, the observed success rates of providing them are usually in the
range of 40 to 60 percent, even with experienced subjects (Croson and Marks 2000). Such
ine¢ ciency has been observed in many di⁄erent settings and so is a very robust empirical
result. What is lacking is a theoretical model that can explain this result.
To date, the focus of the theoretical literature on threshold public good games has been
on binary games (e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984; Rapoport 1985, 1987; Au et al. 1998;
O⁄erman et al. 1998, 2001; Makris 2009). In this type of game players either contribute
their entire endowment or contribute nothing, and the literature has provided a good
basis on which to model contributions. Binary threshold public good games are, however,
very di⁄erent to the continuous version that we are interested in studying here (Suleiman
and Rapoport 1992; Cadsby and Maynes 1999). Despite their wide application, there is
distinct lack of theoretical modelling of continuous threshold public good games. The two
exceptions we know of are Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Suleiman and Rapoport (1992).
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that every perfect Nash equilibrium of a continuous
threshold public good game results in the public good being provided. This makes it even
more puzzling why groups are observed to be so ine¢ cient.1 Suleiman and Rapoport (1992)
1A related theoretical literature considers the subscription game, which is a form of threshold public
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with expected utility maximization or a cooperative model. They found some support for
both models, but also found that neither model was able to predict contributions with
much accurancy.2 To resolve the puzzle of ine¢ ciency, therefore, it is clear we need to
consider deviations from Nash equilibrium.
The approach we shall take, in modelling contributions to threshold public goods, is, as
already mentioned, guided by learning direction theory and impulse balance theory. Both of
these theories say that players will tend to change their behavior in a way that is consistent
with ex-post rationality (Selten and Stoeker 1986; Selten 1998; Ockenfels and Selten 2005;
Selten, Abbink and Cox 2005). Impulse balance theory is particularly appealing for our
purposes because it allows an equilibrium explanation of behavior that can potentially
capture deviations from Nash equilibrium (Ockenfels and Selten 2005; Selten and Chmura
2008).
Learning direction theory and impulse balance theory have been applied in many di⁄er-
ent settings, but not threshold public good games. When applied to such games, learning
direction theory predicts that players will have a tendency to increase their contribution
following a failure to provide the public good, and decrease their contribution if they suc-
ceded in providing the good.3 Impulse balance theory rests on the complimentary idea
that players will change their contribution by an amount proportional to foregone pro￿t.
We show that one interesting implication of this, is that players should be more reactive
to a ￿ near miss￿than ￿ large miss￿ . This is a novel prediction, but is consistent with the
psychology literature on couterfactual thinking (De Cremer and van Dijk 2011).4
If players behave as prescribed by learning direction theory and impulse balance theory,
then the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium can be used to predict outcomes,
good game (e.g. Admati and Perry 1991; Laussel and Palfrey 2003; Barbierei and Malueg 2008). For the
class of game considered in the empirical literature (i.e. simultaneous move games of complete information)
the prediction would again be that groups should be able to e¢ ciently provide the public good.
2More speci￿cally, in their experiments Rapoport and Suleiman (1992) obtained the beliefs of a subject
about the likely contributions of others. From this one can ask whether own contribution is consistent
with beliefs. They found evidence of consistency with both an expected utility model and cooperative
model. This did not, however, translate into an accurate prediction of contributions. Also note, that such
predictions rely on knowing the beliefs of subjects. To apply these models in a general setting, therefore,
one would require a model of belief formation.
3The picture is somewhat more complicated than this (as we shall formally show in section 3), but this
statement captures the basic idea.
4Other models of learning or behavior, such as adaptive learning, would predict a larger response follow-
ing a large miss (i.e. contributions being well short of the threshold) than a near miss (i.e. contributions
being close to the threshold).
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balance equilibria for a general class of threshold public good games. This is the main
theoretical contribution of the paper.
We complement our theoretical ￿ndings with an analysis of experimental data, of our
own and that existing in the literature. Our own data is analyzed in detail, and provides
good support for both of the predictions stated above. Namely, subjects change contribu-
tions in the direction predicted by learning direction theory, and in proportion to foregone
pro￿t. Consistent with this, we ￿nd that weighted impulse balance equilibria o⁄er a good ￿t
with the observed success rates. To follow this up, we revisit a question, raised by Cadsby
et al. (2008), concerning the comparison between step return and net reward as predictors
of success in providing threshold public goods. We show that impulse balance theory can
explain the success rates observed by Cadsby et al. (2008) and, therefore, capture the role
played by the step return and net reward.
Our main conclusion, therefore, will be that a model based on learning direction the-
ory and impulse balance theory can capture and make sense of observed success rates in
threshold public good games. The contribution of this paper is, thus, twofold. First, we
propose a theoretical model that can explain observed success rates in threshold public
good games. We believe that this is a signi￿cant step forward in our understanding of such
games, and creates an important link between theory and the large empirical literature.
The second contribution of the paper is to apply learning direction theory and impulse
balance theory in a new context and show that they have good predictive power.
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we introduce threshold public good games and our
experimental design. In section 3 we focus on learning direction theory, and in section 4
on impulse balance theory. In section 5 we conclude. Further details are contained in an
appendix.
2 Threshold public good games
We shall consider a simultaneous and symmetric threshold public good game. The game
is characterized by four positive integers: the number of players n, the size of endowment
E, a threshold T, and a value of the public good V . The details of the game can now be
explained as follows.
Each player is endowed with E units of a private good. Simultaneously, and indepen-
dently of each other, players decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards
4
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player i. Also, let Y =
Pn
j=1 xj denote total contributions and let Y￿i = Y ￿ xi denote
the total contribution of players other than i. If total contributions, Y , equal or exceed
the threshold T then the public good is provided and each player receives an additional
V units of private good. If total contributions are less than the threshold then the public
good is not provided.
We shall assume that if total contributions are above the threshold there is no rebate
of the excess contributions. If total contributions are less than the threshold then we allow
two possibilities, either (i) players get a full refund of their contribution, or, (ii) they get no




E ￿ xi + V if xi + Y￿i ￿ T
E if xi + Y￿i < T
:
If there is no refund the payo⁄ function of player i = 1;n can be written
￿i(xi;Y￿i) =
(
E ￿ xi + V if xi + Y￿i ￿ T
E ￿ xi if xi + Y￿i < T
:
We shall assume that nV > T meaning that it is socially e¢ cient to provide the public
good. We shall also assume that nE ￿ T meaning that it is feasible for players to provide
the good.
There are typically several pure strategy Nash equilibria in simultaneous threshold
public good games. These can be partitioned into two broad categories. There is a set of
equilibria where the sum of contributions equals the threshold and also a set of equilibria
where the sum of contributions is less than the threshold. Formally, vector of contributions
(x1;:::;xn) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if ￿i(xi;Y￿i) ￿
￿i(x;Y￿i) for all x 2 f0;1;:::;Eg and i = 1;n. It is simple to show that there will always
exist a set of Nash equilibria with public good provision where
xi + Y￿i = T and xi ￿ V
for all i = 1;n.5 If T > minfE;V g then there will also exist a set of Nash equilibria
5If nminfE;V g > T there will be several of such equilibria. All of the equilibria of this type yield a
total payo⁄ to players of nV ￿ T but di⁄er in how this total is distributed amongst players. A player who
5
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contribtions (x1;:::;xn) where
xi + Y￿i < T and T ￿ Yi > minfE;V g
for all i = 1;n. In the case of no refund the set consists of only the vector (0;:::;0), where
all players contribute 0. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that in the case of full refund
every perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with public good provision.
2.1 Experimental design
In the analysis to follow, we shall draw on data from laboratory experiments in which
subjects played threshold public good games. In this section we shall introduce the ex-
perimental design. The design conformed to the standard design used in the literature
(e.g. Croson and Marks 2000; Cadsby et al. 2008). Speci￿cally, subjects played the same
threshold public good game over 25 rounds using a ￿xed matching protocol. Feedback was
given at the end of each round on total contributions to the public good, whether or not
the public good was provided, and own payo⁄. The language used in the instructions was
deliberately neutral using phrases like ￿ allocate to a group account￿rather than contribute
or invest towards a public good. [The instructions used are provided in an appendix].
The experiments were run at the University of Kent with subjects recruited from across
the university population. The interaction was anonymous and via computer terminal, us-
ing z-tree (Fischbacher, 2009). We were careful to recruit subjects that had not participated
in a similar experiment before. We ran 9 sessions in all. In each session subjects were ran-
domly assigned to a group, assigned to a treatment, and then played the relevant threshold
public good game for 25 rounds. At the end of the session each subject was paid in cash
an amount equal to their total payo⁄ over the 25 rounds divided by 200 plus a £2.00 show
up fee. Each session lasted around 45 minutes and the average payment was £9.96.
There were 8 di⁄erent treatments, summarized in Table 1. The Baseline treatment
corresponds to the baseline treatment commonly used in the literature (e.g. Croson and
Marks 2000; Cadsby et al. 2008). The High, High 2, Low and Low 2 treatments are
motivated and discussed in detail by Alberti and Cartwright (2009). The main thing to
note is that the high or low refers to a relatively high or low endowment when compared to
contributes less receives a higher payo⁄.
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shall see below that the 8 treatments allow us to consider a variety of di⁄erent strategic
environments.
Table 1: A summary of the experimental treatments
Treatment n E V T Refund No. of subjects
Baseline 5 55 50 125 Yes 20
Baseline NR 5 55 50 125 No 20
High 5 70 50 125 Yes 25
High NR 5 70 50 125 No 20
High 2 5 55 20 50 Yes 25
Low 5 30 50 125 Yes 25
Low NR 5 30 50 125 No 20
Low 2 5 55 100 250 Yes 25
3 Learning Direction Theory
Learning direction theory says that there is a tendency for players to adjust their behavior
in accordance with ex-post rationality (Selten and Stoeker 1986; Selten 1998; Ockenfels
and Selten 2005; Selten, Abbink and Cox 2005). Informally, in a threshold public good
game this means that when the sum of contributions exceeds the threshold there will
be a tendency for players to decrease their contributions in the subsequent round. If
the sum of contributions falls short of the threshold then there may be a tendency to
increase contributions. Note that this does not mean players will always adjust behavior
in accordance with ex-post rationality; rather, there is a tendency to do so that is stronger
than would be expected from random behavior. In this section we shall formalize the
predictions of learning direction theory in the context of a threshold public good and then
test these predictions against our experimental data.
3.1 Experience conditions and predictions of learning direction theory
In order to formally apply learning direction theory we need to distinguish possible ex-post
tendencies (Selten 1998). In the threshold public good game considered here we distinguish
seven possible ex-post outcomes or experience conditions. In the case of no refund these
7
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Lost opportunity (LO). Total contributions were less than the threshold and the player
would have done better to contribute the amount needed to just achieve the threshold.
Formally, xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi + Y￿i < T and T ￿ Y￿i ￿ minfE;V g: (LO)
The ￿rst condition says that the public good is not provided. The second condition says
that it could have been provided if player i had contributed more and that player i￿ s payo⁄
would have been higher by doing so.6 The optimal ex-post contribution is T ￿Y￿i, i.e. the
amount needed to achieve the threshold.
Wasted contribution (WC). The total contributions were less than the threshold and the
player would have done better to contribute less. Formally, xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi + Y￿i < T and xi > 0 and T ￿ Y￿i > minfE;V g: (WC)
The ￿rst condition says that the public good is not provided. The third condition says that
the player either could not have done enough on her own to provide the good or would not
have had an incentive to do so. The optimal ex-post contribution is 0.
Spot on contribution (SO). The total contributions are equal to the threshold and the player
bene￿ts from the public good. Formally, xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi + Y￿i = T and xi ￿ V: (SO)
There is no incentive to increase or decrease the contribution.
Overcontribution (OC). Total contributions exceed the threshold, and the player would
have done better to contribute the amount needed to just achieve the threshold. Formally,
xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi + Y￿i > T and xi > 0 and T ￿ Y￿i ￿ V: (OC)
6If T ￿ Y￿i = V the player is indi⁄erent between contributing 0 or contributing T ￿ Y￿i. So, this can
be seen as either the lost opportunity or wasted contribution experience condition. For simplicity, we shall
treat it as the lost opportunity experience condition.
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T ￿ Y￿i if Y￿i < T or 0 if Y￿i ￿ T.
Excessive contribution (EC). Total contributions exceed the threshold, but the player does
not, and cannot, bene￿t from the public good. Formally, xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi + Y￿i ￿ T and T ￿ Y￿i > V: (EC)
There is an incentive to reduce the contribution. The optimal ex-post contribution is 0.
Zero contribution (ZY, ZN). If the player contributes 0 and could not have increased her
payo⁄ by contributing more then there is no incentive to change her contribution. We
distinguish whether the public good is provided or not (zero yes and zero no). Formally,
xi and Y￿i satisfy,
xi = 0 and Y￿i ￿ T, (ZY)
xi = 0 and T ￿ Y￿i > minfE;V g. (ZN)
In the case of a full refund we distinguish the same seven possible ex-post experience
conditions but note changes to the wasted contribution and zero no conditions. The full
refund means that there is no clearly de￿ned ex-post optimum in these two conditions and
so, there is no ex-post incentive to either increase or decrease the contribution. Intuitively,
one might expect an increase in contribution up to a maximum of minfE;V g, but this is
not a prediction of learning direction theory.
We summarize the seven experience conditions for the case of no refund and full refund
with Table 2. Note that di⁄erent subjects in the same group may face di⁄erent experience
conditons. For example, one subject may face the lost opportunity condition while another
faces the wasted contribution condition. Similarly, one subject may face the excessive
contribution condition while another faces the overcontribution condition.
Table 2: The ex-post rational optimum, the di⁄erence between the optimum and the actual
contribution, and the predicted tendency for adjustment of contribution in the subsequent
9
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LO T ￿ Y￿i T ￿ Y￿i ￿ xi increase (")
WC (no refund) 0 xi decrease (#)
WC (full refund) ￿ ￿ ambiguous (-)
SO xi 0 no change (0)
OC maxfT ￿ Y￿i;0g minfxi ￿ T + Y￿i;xig decrease (#)
EC 0 xi decrease (#)
ZY 0 0 no change (0)
ZN (no refund) 0 0 no change (0)
ZN (full refund) ￿ ￿ ambiguous (-)
In order to summarize the predictions of learning direction theory we introduce some
notation. Let ￿b;￿b and ￿b denote the probability that a player in experience condition
b will increase, decrease, or leave unchanged their contribution in the subsequent round.
The following hypothesis formalizes the predictions of learning direction theory.
Hypothesis 1. There will be a tendency for players to change their contribution consistent
with learning direction theory. In the case of no or full refund this means,
￿LO > ￿LO; ￿OC < ￿OC; ￿EC < ￿EC; (1)
￿SO;￿ZY > ￿LO;￿OC;￿EC: (2)
In the case of no refund it means in addition,
￿WC < ￿WC; (3)
￿SO;￿ZY > ￿WC (4)
￿ZN > ￿LO;￿WC;￿OC;￿EC: (5)
It is important to note that learning direction theory, as described by Selten (1998) and
Selten et al. (2005), only implies the inequalities given in (1) and (3). The inequalities in
(2), (4) and (5) follow from ex-post rationality and are clearly in the spirit of learning direc-
10
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data.
3.2 Learning direction theory and the experimental data
In order to evaluate Hypothesis 1 we shall estimate ￿b;￿b and ￿b for each of the experience
conditions and each of the treatments. At the end of each round we can work out the
experience condition faced by each subject. We also know whether each subject increased,
decreased, or kept unchanged their contribution in the subsequent round (excluding round
25). These two things allow us to estimate the relevant probabilities, which we shall
denote b ￿b;b ￿b and b ￿b (in percentage terms). Table 3 details the number of instances of
each experience condition in the Baseline and Baseline-NR treatments (in the ￿rst 24
rounds). It also details the proportion of instances that subjects increased or decreased
their contribution in the subsequent round. For example, in the Baseline treatment, there
were 194 instances where a subject faced the lost opportunity experience condition; in
13.9% of these instances we observed a decrease in contribution, in 51% an increase, and
in 35.1% no change. Tables 4 and 5 do the same for the remaining treatments.
The data summarized in tables 3, 4 and 5 are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and the
predictions of learning direction theory. To illustrate, aggregating across all treatments, the
poportion of instances of the lost opportunity experience condition where subjects increase
their contribution is around 50 percent while the proportion of instances where subjects
decrease their contribution is only around 10 percent. In the case of the overcontribution
experience condition, the proportions are around 10 percent and 40 percent respectively. In
the case of the spot on and zero yes experience conditions, subjects kept their contributions
unchanged in over 70 percent of instances while in the other experience conditions the
proportion is 30 to 50 percent.
To formally test Hypothesis 1, we shall focus ￿rst on inequalities (2), (4) and (5). We
performed pairwise likelihood ratio tests of the hypotheses ￿SO = ￿LO;￿SO = ￿EC;:::;￿ZN =
￿EC. Table 6 reports the results. With the exception of the spot on experience condition
in the Baseline NR treatment, and the excessive contribution experience condition, the
7To better understand this distinction, note that for experience conditions spot on, zero yes, and zero
no the ex-post rational adjustment is to leave contributions unchanged. If one thinks, therefore, of learning
direction theory as predicting whether contributions will tend to increase or decrease, it does not apply in
these instances. One can, however, think of learning direction theory as predicting a tendency for unchanged
contributions.
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number of observations. In summary, we do observe subjects leaving their contribution
unchanged more often in the spot on, zero yes and zero no experience conditions than in
the other experience conditions.
To test inequalities (1) and (3) we need to take into account a possible regression e⁄ect
(Ockenfels and Selten 2005). The regression e⁄ect here is that purely by chance a large
contribution is likely to be followed by a smaller contribution and a small contribution is
likely to be followed by a larger contribution.8 We, therefore, test Hypothesis 1 against the
alternative of players randomly deciding how much to contribute between 0 and minfE;V g.
In testing this alternative we recognise that subjects leave their contribution unchanged
more often than could be explained by chance. So, we look at instances where subjects
did change their contribution and ask with what probability they would increase (LO) or
decrease (WC and OC) their contribution if choosing randomly.9 With this we can work
out the probability that the observed ratio of b ￿b to b ￿b would happen by chance using the
binomial test. Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the derived probabilities. These probabilities strongly
support Hypothesis 1 against the alternative. The only exception is the overcontribution
experience condition in the Low and Low NR treatments. This experience condition can
only occur in these treatments if a subject gives all, or almost all, of their endowment. Thus,
decreasing contributions are almost inevitable and one can not distinguish Hypothesis 1
from the alternative.
We summarize these ￿ndings,
Result 1: We ￿nd good support in the experimental data for Hypothesis 1. Contributions
do change in the ways predicted by learning direction theory.
We shall build on this result by looking at impulse balance theory. Before doing so, we
make two further observations about the data in Tables 3 to 5.
First, consider the wasted contribution experience condition and contrast treatments
with a full refund to those with no refund. In treatments with no refund we observe that
b ￿WC > b ￿WC re￿ ecting a tendency to decrease contributions, consistent with Hypothesis
8This e⁄ect is unlikely to explain the data for the wasted contribution experience condition in the case
of no refund because in this case the regression e⁄ect works in the opposite direction to that predicted by
learning direction theory. For the lost opportunity and overcontribution experience conditions the regression
e⁄ect is a possible concern.
9In the excess contribution experience condition this predicts that players will always decrease their
contribution.
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to increase contributions. Recall that learning direction theory is agnostic about what to
expect in treatments with a full refund. This observation will prove useful when we look
at impulse balance theory.
Next, consider the di⁄erence between the tendency to increase contributions in the lost
opportunity experience condition, b ￿LO, and the tendency to decrease contributions in the
overcontribution experience condition, b ￿OC. The former is typically larger, averaging 50%,
than the latter, averaging 40%. A very similar tendency, in the context of sealed-bid ￿rst-
price auctions, was observed by Ockenfels and Selten (2005) with analogous numbers of
57% and 47%.10 In the context of a threshold public good game, the weaker motivation to
decrease contributions may re￿ ect a utility ￿ bonus￿from succeeding in providing the public
good (as hinted at by Rapoport 1987).
Table 3. Change of contribution in the Baseline and the Baseline NR treatments sorted by





no. b ￿b b ￿b prob. no. b ￿b b ￿b prob.
LO 194 13:9 51:0 0:00 100 15:0 46:0 0:00
WC 45 31:1 40:0 0:00 104 47:1 28:8 0:00
SO 15 13:3 26:7 ￿ 8 0:0 87:5 ￿
OC 207 48:8 19:3 0:00 154 38:3 14:9 0:01
EC 7 42:9 0 0:00 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
ZY 11 ￿ 27:3 ￿ 13 ￿ 23:1 ￿
ZN 1 ￿ 100 ￿ 101 ￿ 6:9 ￿
Table 4. Change of contribution in the High, High NR and High 2 treatments sorted by
10One can directly compare our lost opporunity experience opporunity condition with the lost opportunity
of Ockenfels and Selten (2005). One can also compare our overcontribution experience condition with the
their overpayment condition.
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Experience
Condition
High High NR High 2
no. b ￿b b ￿b prob. no. b ￿b b ￿b prob. no. b ￿b b ￿b prob.
LO 209 12:4 45:0 0:00 103 9:7 39:8 0:00 169 5:3 48:5 0:00
WC 30 20:0 50:0 0:00 39 64:1 17:9 0:00 11 36:4 54:5 0:00
SO 30 6:7 10:0 ￿ 28 17:9 7:1 ￿ 75 16:0 14:7 ￿
OC 308 35:1 9:4 0:00 209 40:2 16:7 0:00 340 40:0 12:9 0:00
EC 16 56:3 12:5 0:00 17 11:8 17:6 0:00 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
ZY 6 ￿ 16:7 ￿ 16 ￿ 18:8 ￿ 5 ￿ 0 ￿
ZN 1 ￿ 100:0 ￿ 68 ￿ 8:8 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿




Low Low NR Low 2
no. b ￿b b ￿b prob. no. b ￿b b ￿b prob. no. b ￿b b ￿b prob.
LO 103 9:7 62:1 0:00 17 23:5 29:4 0:53 81 11:1 49:4 0:00
WC 115 13:0 45:2 1:00 158 49:4 22:8 0:00 82 13:4 24:4 1:00
SO 25 4:0 20:0 ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 145 8:3 15:2 ￿
OC 355 35:5 9:0 0:93 10 50 0 0:68 290 30:0 11:0 0:00
ZY 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
ZN 2 ￿ 50:0 ￿ 295 ￿ 10:2 ￿ 2 ￿ 100 ￿
Table 6. The proportion of instances of the spot on, zero yes and zero no conditions where
the contribution is left unchanged. Also, the statistical signi￿cance of pairwise likelihood
ratio tests of the hypothesis ￿a = ￿b where a 2 fSO;ZY;ZNg and b 2 fLO;WC;OC;ECg.
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LO WC OC EC
Baseline SO 60:0 0:06 ￿ 0:03 0:90
ZY 72:7 0:01 ￿ 0:01 0:50
Baseline NR SO 12:5 0:11 0:43 0:04 ￿
ZY 76:9 0:01 0:00 0:03 ￿
ZN 93:1 0:00 0:00 0:00 ￿
High SO 83:3 0:02 ￿ 0:00 0:75
ZY 83:3 0:02 ￿ 0:00 0:47
High NR SO 75:0 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:75
ZY 81:2 0:02 0:00 0:00 0:47
ZN 91:2 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:04
High 2 SO 69:3 0:00 ￿ 0:00 ￿
ZY 100:0 0:01 ￿ 0:01 ￿
Low SO 76:0 0:00 ￿ 0:04 ￿
Low NR ZN 89:8 0:00 0:00 0:00 ￿
Low 2 SO 76:5 0:00 ￿ 0:00 ￿
4 Impulse Balance Theory
The application of learning direction theory allowed us to make qualitative predictions on
the tendency of players to increase or decrease their contribution. To take this a stage
further we shall now apply impulse balance theory. This will allow us to make quantitative
predictions about contributions based on the principle of ex-post rationality (Ockenfels and
Selten 2005; Selten and Chmura 2008). In order to do this we need to distinguish upward
and downward impulses.
In the context of a threshold public good game a player can be said to have an upward
impulse if the ex-post optimal contribution exceeds their actual contribution. Similarly, a
player can be said to have a downward impulse if the ex-post optimal contribution is lower
than their actual contribution. Impulse balance theory measures the strength of an impulse
as the amount of foregone pro￿t. To formalize these ideas, let xr
i denote the contribution
of player i in round r and let exr
i denote the ex-post optimal contribution. A player has
15
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i > xr


















denote the pro￿t she
would have got if contributing the ex-post optimal amount. The strength of the impulse
is e￿r
i ￿ ￿r
i and depends on the experience condition. Table 7 details the direction and
strength of the impulse for each of the seven experience conditions.




Contribution (exi) Adjustment (jxi ￿ exij) Direction Strength (j￿i ￿ e￿ij)
LO (no refund) T ￿ Y￿i T ￿ Y￿i ￿ xi " V ￿ T + Y￿i + xi
LO (full refund) T ￿ Y￿i T ￿ Y￿i ￿ xi " V ￿ T + Y￿i
WC (no refund) 0 xi # xi
WC (full refund) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
SO xi 0 0 0
OC maxfT ￿ Y￿i;0g minfxi ￿ T + Y￿i;xig # minfY￿i + xi ￿ T;xig
EC 0 xi # xi
ZY and ZN 0 0 0 0
ZN (full refund) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The basic idea behind impulse balance theory is that a player tends to change their
contribution in proportion to the strength of the impulse they face. This can be summarized
in the following hypothesis.









Hypothesis 2 complements Hypothesis 1 by saying how much players will tend to change
their contribution (while Hypothesis 1 says in what direction they will tend to change their
contribution). We can see from table 7 that it makes a particularly distinctive prediction in
the lost opportunity experience condition. This is apparent from the strength of impulse
being inversely proportional to the ex-post rational adjustment. Hypothesis 2 predicts
that players will increase their contribution by more the closer are contributions to the
threshold, because the impulse is stronger. This prediction is consistent with the evidence
that counterfactual thinking occurs more often in the case of a ￿ near miss￿rather than
￿ large miss￿(Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Miller 1986; De Cremer and
van Dijk 2011).
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mental data is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In Table 8 we report OLS regressions for each
treatment in which we regress the change in a subject￿ s contribution against the strength of
impulse. Note that in the treatments with a full refund the impulse in the wasted contribu-
tion experience condition is unde￿ned. For comparison, we regress against the contribution
(which equals the size of impulse there would have been if there was no refund). This al-
lows us to distinguish whether the change in contribution depends on foregone pro￿t, as
predicted by Hypothesis 2, or solely on the previous contribution. In the former we should
expect to see a correlation in the case of no refund but not in the case of full refund.
The results reported in Table 8 are consistent with Hypothesis 2, and 1. We observe
a strong correlation between the change in contribution and strength of impulse. These
correlations are also reassuringly similar across treatments. Moreover, we only observe
a correlation with regard to the wasted contribution experience condition in the case of
no refund. Interestingly the correlation between the change in contribution and strength
of impulse is less for the lost opportunity experience condition than the overcontribution
experience condition. This may appear inconsistent with our earlier ￿nding of a weaker
motivation to decrease than increase contributions. There is, however, no inconsistency,
because the foregone pro￿t and, hence, strength of impulse is typically much larger in the
lost opportunity experience condition.
Table 8. OLS regression results with the change of contribution as dependent variable and
impulse crossed with experience condition as independent variables. Standard errors are
given in brackets, and *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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If players behave consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2 then one can obtain a natural predic-
tion of what contributions should be over time. This prediction is captured by the notion
of impulse balance equilibrium (Selten at al. 2005; Ockenfels and Selten 2005; Selten and
Chmura 2008). To derive the equilibrium we need a parameterized model of player be-
haviour. One can then derive an expected upward and downward impulse, which we shall
denote I+ and I￿. If
I+ = ￿I￿;
where ￿ > 0 is a downward impulse weight, then there is a weighted impulse balance
equilibrium. The parameter ￿ allows for the possibility that players may respond di⁄erently
to upward and downward impulses.11 An equilibrium determines the parameters of the
model which then allow a prediction of contributions and the success rate of providing the
public good.
As just mentioned, in order to derive the set of impulse balance equilibria we need a
simple, parameterized model of player behaviour. Here we assume that: (1) Each player
i = 1;n partitions her endowment of the private good, E, into equally sized packages. Let
z denote the size of package. For example, a player with an endowment of 55 may think
in terms of 55 packages of size one, z = 1, or 11 packages of size ￿ve, z = 5. (2) The
player then contributes each package (up to a maximum of V units of the private good)
independently with probability p. We shall assume that z and p are the same for all players.
This means that contributions can be modelled as a binomial distribution. In particular,
the probability that player i contributes xi units of the private good is equal to















p￿i(1 ￿ p)U￿￿i if ￿i 2 Z
0 if ￿i = 2 Z
(8)





is the most packages a player is willing to contribute.12 Clearly,
11One may also want to allow for the possibility that players respond di⁄erently to di⁄erent experience
conditions. Ultimately this will have little relevance to the prediction, as the equilibrium we shall focus
on will primarily be determined by what happens in the lost opportunity and overcontribution experience
conditions.
12For simplicity we assume that E and V are multiples of z.
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probability of providing the public good.
While clearly sylized, the assumption of a binomial distribution is broadly consistent
with the observed contributions in threshold public good games (Alberti and Cartwright
2009). It also brings our approach in line with the literature on binary threshold public
good games (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984; Rapoport 1985, 1987), where one can think of
the package size as being equal to the total endowment, z = E. Note that we can also
easily avoid the somewhat cumbersome notation in (7) by reintepreting E;V;T;xi and Y￿i
as being expressed in packages of the private good rather than units of the private good.
For example, if packages are of size ￿ve, z = 5, then we can think of the Baseline treatment
as having E = 11;V = 10 and T = 25 and a contribution of xi = 2 as equating to 10 units
of the private good. This is the approach we shall take in the following.
With this model we can work out the weighted impulse balance equilibria for each
treatment. More speci￿cally, for any exogeneously given value of ￿, we can solve for the
equilibria, and determine equilibrium values for p. This, in turn, allows us to estimate
contributions and the probability of providing the public good. In determining the equi-
libria there is an important theoretical distinction between E ￿ V and E < V and so we
consider each in turn. We shall also consider both packages of size one and ￿ve. A focus on
packages of size ￿ve, when looking at our data, appears apt given that, aggregating across
all treatments, 72.5% of contributions were an exact multiple of ￿ve. The one possible
exception is the High 2 treatment, where the proportion contributing a multiple of ￿ve was
still 55.5%, but notably lower than in the other treatments. In this treatment the T and V
were small enough that it may be more appropriate to model with package sizes of one.13
4.1.1 High relative endowment
We shall start by working out the weighted impulse balance equilibrium in a setting where
n = 5, E ￿ V and 4V > T > V . This setting includes the two baseline and three high
treatments as special cases, and is mainly characterized by the fact that E ￿ V . Figure 1
presents a typical picture for this case and shows the seven experience conditions. On the
horizontal axis we measure a player￿ s own contribution and on the vertical axis we measure
the sum of contributions by the four other players.
13There was no treatment where it seemed appropriate to consider packages of size 10, or anything other
than one or ￿ve.
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In order to calculate the expected upward and downward impulse we need to know the
probability distribution over a player￿ s individual contribution and the total contribution
of others, xi ￿ Y￿i. Given that we assume contributions are distributed binomially and









pxi+Y￿i(1 ￿ p)5V ￿xi￿Y￿i (9)
as the probability of player i contributing xi and the other four players contributing Y￿i in
total. To progress further we consider separately the case of a full refund and no refund.
Full refund In the case of full refund the expected upward impulse I+ comes entirely
from the lost opportunity experience condition. Using the notation from ￿gure 1 and
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(V ￿ T + Y￿i)Pr(xi;Y￿i):
The expected downward impulse I￿ comes entirely from the overcontribution experience



















Recall that weighted impulse balance equilibrium requires I+ = ￿I￿:Given particular
values of V;T and ￿ it is possible to solve for the set of equilibria. Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
illustrate I+ and I￿ in the Baseline treatment for packages of size one and ￿ve respectively.
(These ￿gures also apply to the High treatment.) We can see that there are two equilibria.
For example, when ￿ = 1 the equilibria are p￿
1 = 0 and p￿
2 = 0:517 assuming packages
of size one and p￿
1 = 0 and p￿
2 = 0:495 assuming packages of size ￿ve. Note that when
p 2 (0;p￿
2) the upward impulse exceeds the downward impulse and when p 2 (p￿
2;1] the
downward impulse exceeds the upward impulse. This suggests that the p￿
2 equilibrium is
the more natural and interesting one to focus on.14 With this we can derive predictions
on outcomes. For example, when p￿
2 = 0:517, and packages are of size one, the probability
that the public good will be provided is 0:73. When p￿
2 = 0:495, and packages are of size
￿ve, the probability is 0:53. Later, in sections 4.2 and 4.3, we shall interpret the equilibria
obtained in more detail.
Figure 2: The values of I+ and I￿ in the Baseline (and High) treatment assuming packages
14Also, recall that in the case of full refund, learning direction theory is ambiguous as to what play-
ers should do in the wasted contribution experience condition, but we observed a tendency to increase
contributions. This would further suggest that we can ignore the p
￿
1 = 0 equilibrium.
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No refund In the case of no refund, the expected upward impulse I+ still comes entirely






(V ￿ T + Y￿i + xi)Pr(xi;Y￿i):
The di⁄erence, when compared to the full refund case, is the additional +xi term in the
impulse that occurs because the contribution is not refunded. The expected downward
impulse I￿ comes from the wasted contribution and overcontribution experience conditions.






























Again, given particular values of V;T and ￿, it is possible to solve for the set of weighted
impulse balance equilibria. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate I+ and I￿ in the Baseline NR
treatment for packages of size one and size ￿ve respectively. (These ￿gures also apply to
the High NR treatment.) We can see that there are now three equilibria. For example,
when ￿ = 1 the equilibria are p￿
1 = 0;p￿
2 = 0:368 and p￿
3 = 0:528 with a package size one
and p￿
1 = 0;p￿
2 = 0:350 and p￿
3 = 0:527 with a package size ￿ve.
In this case it is natural and interesting to focus on the p￿
1 and p￿
3 equilibria because the
downward impulse exceeds the upward impulse when p 2 (p￿
1;p￿
2) [ (p￿
3;1] and the upward
impulse exceeds the downward impulse when p 2 (p￿
2;p￿
3). The predictions that we can
make in this case are, therefore, somewhat ambiguous. Some groups may converge on the
p￿
1 equilibrium where the public good is never provided, while other groups may converge
on the p￿
3 equilibrium where the public good is sometimes provided. For example, when
p￿
3 = 0:528, and packages are of size one, the probability that the public good will be
provided is 0:83. When p￿
3 = 0:527, and packages are of size ￿ve, the probability is 0:70.
Figure 3: The values of I+ and I￿ in the Baseline NR treatment assuming packages of size
one, ￿gure 3(a), and ￿ve, ￿gure 3(b).
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We shall next work through a setting where E < V . Speci￿cally, we shall assume that
n = 5, E < V and T > 4E. This setting includes the three low treatments as special cases.
Figure 4 presents the typical picture for this case and shows the ￿ve experience conditions.
(Note that the excessive contribution and zero yes experience condition are not possible in
this setting.) We shall again distinguish the case of full and no refund. Before doing so,
we clarify that the probability distribution over a player￿ s individual contribution and the









pxi+Y￿i(1 ￿ p)5E￿xi￿Y￿i: (10)
Figure 4: The ￿ve experience conditions in the Low 2 treatment.
Full refund As in the baseline and high treatments, the expected upward impulse I+
comes entirely from the lost opportunity experience condition. Using ￿gure 4 and recalling
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(V ￿ T + Y￿i)Pr(xi;Y￿i): (11)
The downward impulse I￿ comes entirely from the overcontribution experience condition.






(Y￿i + xi ￿ T)Pr(xi;Y￿i): (12)
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the upward and downward impulse in the Low treatment
with packages of size one and ￿ve respectively. As in ￿gures 2(a) and 2(b), we see that
there are two equilibria. The only notable di⁄erence in ￿gure 5, compared to ￿gure 2, is the
quantitative increase in p which re￿ ects the lower endowment. For example, if ￿ = 1 the
equilibria are p￿
1 = 0 and p￿
2 = 0:855 if the package size is one and p￿
1 = 0 and p￿
2 = 0:834 if
the package size is ￿ve. The corresponding probabilities of the public good being provided
are 0:81 and 0:62.
Figure 5: The values of I+ and I￿ in the Low treatment for packages of size one, ￿gure
5(a) and ￿ve, ￿gure 5(b).
No refund In the case of no refund the expected upward impulse I+ still comes entirely
from the lost opportunity experience condition but is of di⁄erent magnitude. It is calculated
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(V ￿ T + Y￿i + xi)Pr(xi;Y￿i):
The expected downward impulse I￿ comes from the wasted contribution and overcon-

















(Yi + xi ￿ T)Pr(xi;Yi):
The total downward impulse is I￿ = IWC
￿ + IOC
￿ .
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate the upward and downward impulse for packages of size
one and ￿ve, respectively. We can see that there are potentially three equilibria, similar to
in ￿gures 4(a) and 4(b). For example, if ￿ = 1 and packages are of size one the equilibria
are p￿
1 = 0;p￿
2 = 0:775 and p￿
3 = 0:863. The main thing we note here, however, is that
the downward impulse may be su¢ ciently large that only the p￿
1 equilibrium exists. For
example, if ￿ = 1 and packages are of size ￿ve, the unique equilibrium is p￿
1 = 0. The
prediction, therefore, is that the public good is only provided, when packages are of size
￿ve, if the weight on downward impulse ￿ is small enough.
Figure 6: The values of I+ and I￿ in the Low NR treatment for packages of size one, ￿gure
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4.2 Impulse balance and the experimental data
In the above section we have shown how to calculate the weighted impulse balance equilibria
of a threshold public good game. We did so by considering two general settings that include
all our experimental treatments. This approach can easily be extended to cover all other
possibilities (as we show in an appendix). What we shall do now is state some basic
hypotheses concerning cross treatment e⁄ects and then evaluate these hypotheses with
regard to our experimental data.
Let us ￿rst compare the weighted impulse balance equilibrium for the case of a full
refund. Table 9 summarizes the probability of the public good being provided across
treatments for di⁄erent values of the weight on the downward impulse, assuming packages
of size one and ￿ve. There is no reason to suppose that ￿ or z should be the same across
di⁄erent treatments. This is, however, a natural benchmark assumption. Imposing it gives
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: If the package size, z, and the weight on the downward impulse, ￿, are the
same across treatments, then the equilibrium probability of the public good being provided
will satisfy the following inequalities:
Pr(Low2) > Pr(Low) > Pr(Baseline) = Pr(High) > Pr(High2):
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in the overcontribution experience condition is smallest in the Low 2 treatment, larger in
the Low treatment, and so on. Impulse balance theory, therefore, predicts a relatively
larger probability of the public good being provided in the Low 2 treatment compared to
the Low treatment, and so on. The success rate in the Baseline and High treatment are
predicted to be the same because the size of the endowment, E, proves irrelevant for the
calculation of impulse balance equilibria if E > V .
Table 9. The equilibrium probability of the public good being provided across treatments




Package size 5 Package size 1
￿ 0:5 1 1:5 0:5 1 1:5
Baseline 0:67 0:53 0:44 0:82 0:72 0:66
High 0:67 0:53 0:44 0:82 0:72 0:66
High2 0:53 0:36 0:27 0:75 0:63 0:54
Low 0:75 0:62 0:53 0:88 0:81 0:76
Low2 0:85 0:75 0:68 0:93 0:88 0:84
Let us next compare the treatments with full refund to those with no refund. Recall
that in the case of no refund there may be a unique weighted impulse balance equilibrium,
p￿
1 = 0, or three equilibria, of which we suggested that two are more interesting, p￿
1 = 0,
and p￿
3 > 0. In the latter case, given the predictions of learning direction theory, players
may converge on either equilibrium. If they converge on the p￿
1 equilibrium the public good
is never provided and, hence, we refer to such players as belonging to a zero group. If they
converge on the p￿
3 equilibrium the public good is provided with positive probability and,
hence, we refer to a positive group. Table 10 summarizes the equilibrium values of p and
the probability of the public good being provided in both zero and positive groups.15
We can see that the equilibrium probability of providing the public good is higher in
15In the case of a full refund we think of all players as belonging to a positive group given our focus on
the equilibrium p
￿
2 > 0. In the case of no refund where there exists a unique equilibrium p
￿
1 = 0, we think
of all players as belonging to a zero group.
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groups. Overall, therefore, whether the probablity of providing the public good is higher
in the case of full refund or no refund will depend on the proportion of positive groups.
Hypothesis 4: If the package size, z, and the weight on the downward impulse, ￿, are the
same across treatments, then the probability of the public good being provided satis￿es
Pr(no refund, positive groups) > Pr(full refund) > Pr(no refund, zero groups):
To give some intuition for this result we make two observations. First, we recall that the
upward impulse, from the lost opportunity experience condition, is relatively high in the
case of no refund; this is because a player￿ s foregone pro￿t if the group fails to achieve the
threshold is higher due to the lack of refund. Second, there is a downward impulse in the
wasted contribution experience condition in the case of no refund but not full refund. We
see, therefore, two counteracting forces, when there is no refund, that may result in higher
contributions, as predicted for positive groups, or lower contributions, as predicted by the
presence of zero groups.
Table 10. The equilibrium probability of the public good being provided across treatments
for di⁄erent values of ￿, assuming a package size of ￿ve and one. The p￿
2 equilibrium is
used for treatments with a full refund, and the p￿
1 and p￿
3 equilibria for treatments with no
refund.
Pr(PG provided)
Package size 5 Package size 1
￿ 0:5 1 1:5 0:5 1 1:5
Baseline, high 0:67 0:53 0:44 0:82 0:72 0:66
Baseline NR, High NR 0;0:81 0;0:70 0;0:61 0;0:89 0;0:83 0;0:78
Low 0:75 0:62 0:53 0:88 0:81 0:76
Low-NR 0;0:81 0;￿ 0;￿ 0;0:93 0;0:88 0;0:84
We turn now to the experimental data and tests of hypotheses 3 and 4. Table 11
16By contrast, in binary games the probability of providing the public good, given Nash equilibrium play,
is lower in the case of no refund than full refund (Palfrey and Rosnethal 1984).
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and group type.17
We shall look ￿rst at the comparison between treatments with and without a refund.
The observed success rates in table 11 are fully consistent with Hypothesis 4. Success
rates are, ceteris paribus, lower when there is no refund (although the di⁄erence is only
statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level in the Low versus Low NR comparison, using a
Mann-Whitney test). This tendency has been observed previously (Cadsby and Maynes
1999; Coats et al. 2009). What is new is that we distinguish between positive and zero
groups. Consistent with Hypothesis 4 we observe a higher success rate in positive groups
when there is no refund. This is the case even if we compare the two positive groups when
there is no refund to the two most successful positive groups when there is a full refund.18
Table 11. The average success rate in all groups, positive groups and zero groups (with the
number of groups in brackets). Also the ￿tted values of p￿ and ￿￿ given: (1) assuming a
package size of ￿ve and p￿ to ￿t observed success; (2) assuming a package size of one and
p￿ to ￿t observed success; (3) assuming a package size of ￿ve and p￿ to ￿t distribution of
individual contributions.







p￿ ￿￿ p￿ ￿￿ p￿ ￿￿
Baseline 0:50 0:50 (4) ￿ 0:490 1:13 0:498 3:36 0:497 0:94
Baseline NR 0:36 0:72 (2) 0:00 (2) 0:531 0:89 0:516 2:22 0:526 1:01
High 0:60 0:60 (5) ￿ 0:508 0:71 0:506 2:03 0:497 0:95
High NR 0:56 0:84 (2) 0:28 (2) 0:560 0:39 0:529 0:90 0:540 0:70
High 2 0:70 0:70 (5) ￿ 0:533 0:22 0:521 0:67 0:528 0:24
Low 0:65 0:65 (5) ￿ 0:839 0:87 0:841 2:77 0:829 1:16
Low NR 0:02 ￿ 0:02 (4) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Low 2 0:71 0:71 (5) ￿ 0:919 1:26 0:916 3:90 0:905 2:47
We shall begin by comparing the ￿ve treatments with a full refund. These treatments
were analysed in detail by Alberti and Cartwright (2010) who found evidence of a U shaped
17In the treatments with no refund we need to distinguish groups into positive and zero groups. Doing
so is simple given a clear distinction between some groups where most people contribute a positive amount
in most rounds and other groups where most people contribute zero in most rounds.
18The average success rate of the two most successful positive groups are 0:68 in the Baseline and 0:76
in the High treatments.
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is broadly consistent with Hypothesis 3. As predicted, the average success rate in the Low
2 treatment is larger than that in the Low treatment which is larger than that in the High
and Baseline treatments. The two inconsistencies are the larger than predicted success
rate in the High 2 treatment, and the discrepancy between success rates in the High and
Baseline treatments. To address these inconsistencies we need to investigate how package
size and the weight on the downward impulse may di⁄er across treatments.
We have already highlighted that a di⁄erent package size may be appropriate in the
High 2 treatment. Recall, that in the High 2 treatment we suggested a package size of
one, while for all other treatments we suggested a package size of ￿ve. From table 9 we
can see that with a package size of one the success rate is predicted, ceteris paribus, to be
larger than with a package size of ￿ve. Di⁄erences in package size can, therefore, explain
why the success rate in the High 2 treatment is higher than the success rate in most other
treatments. To understand the discrepancy between the baseline and high treatments we
need to consider possible di⁄erences in the weight on the downward impulse, ￿. To explore
these issues further we will estimate ￿ from the experimental data. We use three di⁄erent
methods to do this. Our pre⁄ered method for treatments other than High 2 (column (1)
in table 11) is to assume packages of size ￿ve and estimate the value of p that would best
￿t the observed average success rate. With this ￿tted p￿ we can then ￿nd the weight on
the downward impulse ￿￿ that is needed in order for p￿ to be consistent with a weighted
balance impulse equilibrium. Our preferred method for the High 2 treatment (column (2))
is to follow the previous method but with packages of size one. The third method (column
(3)) is to retain the assumption of packages of size ￿ve but to estimate the value of p that
would best ￿t the observed distribution of individual contributions.
A small change in the ￿tted value of p typically leads to a large change in the estimate
of ￿ and so the con￿dence intervals on the estimated ￿￿ s would be large. Even so, for our
preferred methods of estimating ￿, we can see consistent estimates of ￿ in the region of
one. These can be compared with the estimate of ￿ = 0:34 obtained by Ockenfels and
Selten (2005) looking at ￿rst price auctions. The estimates in table 11 also con￿rm that
the relatively large success rate in the High 2 treatment can be best explained by di⁄er-
ences in package size. It is not so simple to explain the observed discrepancy between the
baseline and high treatments. The results in column (1) of table 11 suggest the weight on
the downward impulse is less in the High treatment than the baseline. This is intuitively
plausible, because a larger relative endowment may mean players are less eager to reduce
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tion and suggest the discrepancy more re￿ ects the sensitivity of group success to random
￿ uctuations in individual contributions.
Bringing the above arguments together, we suggest the following result.
Result 2: The experimental data is consistent with: (i) a weight on the downward impulse
of ￿ = 1, (ii) a package size of ￿ve in all treatments except High 2, and (iii) a package size
of one in treatment High 2.
This result follows from the fact that the observed success rates, given in table 11, are
similar to what we would expect if (i)-(iii) hold, see tables 9 and 10. Moreover, assuming
(ii) and (iii) hold, we ￿nd estimates of ￿ that are around one, see table 11. Result 2 sug-
gests that impulse balance theory can provide a good way of prediting and understanding
behavior in threshold public good games. Part (i) of the result is particularly appealing,
because it means that we can apply the theory without need to question which weight on
the downward impulse is appropriate for a particular threshold public good. We shall now
apply the theory in order to address an open question in the literature.
4.3 Step return versus net reward
We shall conclude our analysis by applying, and testing Result 2, in looking at the net
reward and step return as predictors of success in providing threshold public goods. The
net reward, introduced by Cadsby and Maynes (1999), is given by
NRw = V ￿
T
n





Initial results suggested a positive correlation between both the net reward and step return
and the success rate of providing threshold public goods (Cadsby and Maynes 1999; Croson
and Marks 2000). Cadsby et al. (2008) report experimental results designed to distinguish
between changes in the SR and NRw and ￿nd that the SR is the best overall predictor of
success.
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stand why the net reward or step return is, or is not, a predictor of success. In order to
do this we shall respectively ￿x the SR while varing the NRw and then ￿x the SR while
varying the NRw, using the Baseline treatment as our benchmark. More speci￿cally, in
looking at the net reward we ￿x E = 55 and T = 2:5V and consider V = 10;20;:::;100.
This implies that SR = 2 and the NRw varies from 5, when V = 10, to 50, when V = 100.
In ￿gure 7 we plot the predicted success rate for di⁄erent values of ￿ and z as a function
of the net reward. In looking at the step return we ￿x E = 55 and T = (V ￿ 25)n and
consider V = 30;35;:::;75. This implies that NRw = 25 and the SR varies from 6, when
V = 30, to 1:5, when V = 75. In ￿gure 8 we plot the predicted success rate for di⁄erent
values of ￿ and z as a function of the step return.
Figure 7: The relationship between net reward and success rate for di⁄erent values of ￿
and z.
Figure 8: The relationship between step return and success rate for di⁄erent values of ￿
and z.
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and success rate, keeping ￿ and z constant. Figure 8 shows a clear, U shaped relationship
between the step return and success rate, keeping ￿ and z constant. We would argue,
however, given result 2, that it may be appropriate to assume the package size, z, will
change as the parameters of the game change. The NRw is relatively small when the
values of V and T are relatively small. In interpreting ￿gure 7, therefore, it may be
appropriate to assume z = 1 when the NRw is small and z = 5 when the NRw is large.
We can see that this ￿ attens the relationship between the NRw and success rate. The
SR, by contrast, is relatively large when the values of V and T are relatively small. In
interpreting ￿gure 8, therefore, it may be appropriate to assume z = 1 when the SR is
large and z = 5 when the SR is small. We can see that this has the e⁄ect of amplifying
the relationship between the SR and success rate.
The above reasoning o⁄ers a novel and persuasive way to understand prior results
concerning the role of the net reward and step return. In particular, it suggests that,
ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the net reward and success rate,
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further argue this point we shall brie￿ y look at the data of Cadsby et al. (2008). Table 12
summarizes the ￿ve experimental treatments they considered and gives the average success
rate for each treatment. We also detail the prediction one gets by applying impulse balance
theory, with ￿ = 1 and z = 1;5 or 11 depending on the treatment. Setting z = 1, seems
appropriate for treatments A and B, given that V and T are comparable to that in our
High 2 treatment. For treatments D and E we have considered both z = 5, to directly
apply result 2, and z = 11, to re￿ ect the fact that 11 is a common multiple of E and
T
n. Using either prediction 1 or 2, the predicted success rates are broadly in line with the
actual success rates. Moreover, they correctly predict the observed relationship between
the NRw;SR and success rate. Following the approach of Cadsby et al. (2008), as the
net reward increases from 13 to 25 to 44; prediction 1 says the success rate will change
from 0:66 to 0:61 to 0:69 and prediction 2 that it will change from 0:66 to 0:57 to 0:57. In
other words, as previously suggested, we predict no strong relationship between the NRw
and success rate. As the step return increases from 1:57 to 2 to 2:92; prediction 1 says the
success rate will change from 0:55 to 0:63 to 0:76 and prediction 2 says it will change from
0:41 to 0:59 to 0:76. Thus, we predict a strong relationship between the SR and success
rate.
Table 12: The ￿ve treatments considered by Cadsby et al. along with the observed success
rate and that predicted by impulse balance theory, assuming ￿ = 1.
Actual
success
Prediction 1 Prediction 2
Treatment E V T NR SR z success z success
A 55 26 65 13 2 0:54 1 0:66 1 0:66
B 55 50 125 25 2 0:44 5 0:53 5 0:53
C 55 38 65 25 2:92 0:79 1 0:76 1 0:76
D 55 69 220 25 1:57 0:30 5 0:55 11 0:41
E 55 88 220 44 2 0:54 5 0:69 11 0:57
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Threshold public good games are of wide practical interest and the subject of a large
empirical literature. This literature has shown that groups are ine¢ cient at providing
public goods, with success rates typically varying between 40 and 60 percent. In this paper
we propose a theoretical model that not only allows us to capture the observed success
rates, but also understand how these success rates depend on characteristics of the game.
The model has performed well as we considered changes in strategic variables, such as the
endowment and return to the public good, and in contrasting games with a full refund to
those with no refund.
The model draws on learning direction theory and impulse balance theory and says the
players will tend to change their contribution in accordance with ex-post rationality and
foregone pro￿t. Our objective was to apply learning direction theory and impulse balance
theory rather than to ￿ test￿them. An important contribution of the paper, however, is to
show that both theories have good predictive power in a context where they have never been
applied before. This has involved considering ￿ve player games, rather than the two player
games previously considered (Ockenfels and Selten 2005; Selten and Chmura 2008). It is
also noteworthy that impulse balance theory could predict observed success rates without
arbitrary changes in the free parameters of the model. A weight on the downward impulse
of one and intuitive changes in package size from one to ￿ve gave accurate predictions
across a range of threshold public good games.
6 Appendix
We shall show how to calculate the weighted impulse balance equilibrium in a general
setting. Recall that in section 4.2 we treated the setting where n = 5;E ￿ V and 4V > T >
V and in section 4.3 we treated the setting where n = 5;E < V and T > 4E. To complete
the general picture we need to consider n players and the following additional settings, (a)
E ￿ V and T ￿ (n ￿ 1)V , (b) E ￿ V and V ￿ T, (c) E < V and (n ￿ 1)E ￿ T > E, (d)
E < V and E ￿ T. Note that if we let
U = minfE;V g
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(n ￿ 1)U ? T.
The upward impulse is always given by the lost opportunity experience condition. In

























In the case of full refund the downward impulse comes entirely from the overcontribution













where the second term on the right hand side is zero if T + 1 > (n ￿ 1)U. In the case of
no refund the downward impulse comes from the overcontribution and wasted contribution



















where the third term on the right hand side is zero if T ￿ U ￿ 1 < 0.
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